By Felice Feit (’14)

As American troops prepare to leave Iraq, much of the media’s questions and criticisms have focused on the fate of Iraq’s minority populations—none more important than the Kurds.  An ethnic minority that has endured violence and political exclusion for years, the Kurds now rightly fear for their well being in an unstable Iraq.  Over the last fifteen years, U.S. support of Kurdish civil and political rights has been fickle, and it is not surprising that the U.S. did not take measures to ensure Kurdish security after the withdrawal.

The story begins in the mid 1980s when the U.S. supported Saddam Hussein’s regime in its fight against Iran.  Supporting Hussein in his fight against Iran also led the U.S. to support a campaign against a defenseless civilian population. As described by a Kurdish civilian,

In 1988 [U.S. officials] closed their eyes to Halabja because Saddam was the enemy of Iran. But now he’s the enemy, and they are using my town as an excuse. We feel bitter, used, sickened.[i]

The chemical weapon attack on the Iraqi Kurdish town of Halabja was the most deadly moment of Saddam Hussein’s Al-Anfal campaign against the Kurds during the Iran-Iraq War.  The genocide, led primarily by Saddam Hussein’s cousin “Chemical Ali”, also consisted of arbitrary detainment, forced displacement, mass murders, and destruction of infrastructure and whole villages.  As an ally of Saddam’s regime, the United States was complicit in the Al-Anfal campaign but has changed its stance on the issue repeatedly—at times ignoring the atrocities, and condemning them at others. Yet throughout these changes, one aspect of the relationship remained constant: continued U.S. disregard for the well being of the Kurds.  To the United States, the Kurds are merely means to an end—a foreign policy tool in a much larger game in which Kurdish security is overlooked.

Once Al-Anfal began, Washington spearheaded national and international efforts to deny Iraqi responsibility.  Supporting its claims with falsified evidence, the United States accused Iran of using chemical weapons in Halabja.  Although some individuals in Washington fought for recognition and condemnation of Al-Anfal and Halabja, opposition from the House, Senate, and the President—all of whom hoped to appease Saddam—kept the secret from leaking out. Responding to pressure from the United States, the UN instead quickly and thoroughly investigated Iran’s humanitarian rights violations during the war while responses to requests for investigations in Iraq were delayed and negligent. Furthermore, rather than pressuring Iraq to change its behavior, the UN Security Council passed a slew of resolutions condemning both Iraq and Iran for chemical weapons use without any mention of Al-Anfal. The U.S.’s perceived strategic interests against Iran ruled out the possibility of humanitarian intervention in Iraq.  Prioritizing geopolitical concerns over human ones, the U.S. therefore chose not to intervene in a genocide it had helped to create.

After the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. and Iraq no longer shared the need to check Iran’s power. Although Saddam often passionately criticized the West and Israel, in 1989 George H.W. Bush maintained that “normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East.”[ii] Before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. government no longer needed a close relationship with Saddam but maintained a vested interest in the region’s “stability.”

Accordingly, just a month after the end of the war, the U.S.’s stance on the Kurds changed to align with its ambitions for regional stability.  A State Department representative said the U.S. was “convinced that Iraq had used chemical weapons in its military campaign against Kurdish guerillas.”[iii] The U.S. then pushed the UN to pass UNSC Resolution 620, which strongly criticized Iraq’s use of chemical weapons and opened the door for U.S. involvement in the region.  Reagan also criticized Saddam’s targeting of Iraqi Kurdish civilians, claiming that “enough was enough.” [iv] These two arguments represent the two major shifts in rhetoric at the closing of the war: first, Iraq’s use of chemical weapons during the war was unacceptable; second, Iraq targeted Kurdish civilians. Although the U.S. government took a critical stance, no efforts were made to enforce the condemnation.  Kurdish safety alone did not provide enough of an incentive for the U.S. to act.

Then, in August 1990, Saddam invaded Kuwait, a major U.S. ally and oil provider.  This act of aggression threatened both regional stability and U.S. energy security and led to the First Iraq War. Although Saddam had become the enemy, the U.S. wanted to keep him in Iraq to prevent regional instability and maintain the stability, a policy which continued through the Clinton administration.  The war was not about regime change: it was an aggressive policy of containment.

Two months after the end of the war, however, the UNSC changed its tone by passing Resolution 688. The resolution condemned “the repression of the Iraqi civilian population,” focusing specifically on “Kurdish populated areas,” and demanded that Iraq “end this repression” of Kurds.[v] The UN used the Kurdish genocide, which the U.S. had supported indirectly only two years earlier, to denounce Saddam’s regime. The Kurds became relevant to U.S. foreign policy.

The use of Resolution 688 as a justification for intervention in northern Iraq is characteristic of the U.S.’s larger relationship with the Kurdish population: inaction in the face of mass atrocities unless a response aligns with foreign policy goals. Article Three of Resolution 688 insisted that “Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all necessary facilities for their operations.”[vi] The resolution contained Saddam through “UN endorsed and U.S. enforced” methods and was a reprisal for genocide based on U.S. interests. The Kurdish “safe haven” was contingent on Saddam remaining in power. Therefore, the security zone was in line with U.S. aims at the time, allowing state interests to prevail once again over the possibility of pushing for Kurdish self-determination or remedies for past wrongs.

Though the information on Al-Anfal was abundant for years, the U.S., Europe, and the UN never took action. But in April 1991, President Bush argued that “intervention into the internal affairs of Iraq” was justified because of the “overwhelming” concern for the welfare of the Kurds.[vii]  The aforementioned shift in U.S. foreign policy regarding Iraq prompted this change.  Of course, this required a “self-generated amnesia” in regard to the role that the U.S. and Europe played in Al-Anfal.[viii]

Given that the U.S. and Europe did not want a trial—which would have sought Kurdish retribution—Bush’s statement does not seem sincere.  In contrast to what transpired in the courtrooms of the U.S. and Europe-backed International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) after the Yugoslavian conflict, Resolution 688 and the subsequent intervention allowed Western states to accuse Saddam of genocide without exposing their complicity in Al-Anfal to international scrutiny. Lack of concern for the full truth and justice demonstrates a greater concern for Western interests than for human, civil, or political rights.

The events of 9/11 and the Bush doctrine further changed the face of American foreign policy. As early as his 2003 State of the Union Address, Bush suggested that his objective in Iraq would be to oust Saddam and foster regime change. Among other things, he said that “[we] are doing in Afghanistan, we will bring the Iraqi people food, medicines, supplies, and freedom.”[ix] According to Bush, in Afghanistan, the U.S. “helped to liberate an oppressed people” by overthrowing the regime in place. Iraq also had “oppressed people,” namely the Kurds, for whom Bush could claim to intervene for “freedom.”^[x]

In the same speech in which he suggested that Saddam may ude WMDs against Americans, Bush referred to Saddam as a dictator who had Used the “world’s most dangerous weapons” against “whole villages, leaving thousands of his own citizens dead, blind, or disfigured.”[xi] The U.S. used the Al-Anfal tragedy to delegitimize Saddam’s regime and justify further U.S. intervention despite the fact that the U.S. had facilitated the massacre. Nowhere in the speech did Bush mention justice for Kurds or their future should the U.S. invade Iraq save for his vague claims about bringing “freedom” to the country. The Kurds were merely a rhetorical tool.

Once the invasion began, Kurdish victimhood remained a tool for recognizing U.S. interest.  The trials U.S. engineered trials for Saddam and other Ba’ath leaders. These trials fit its objectives and demonstrated no concern for the Kurds. First, the trials allowed the U.S. to escape blame for Al-Anfal. The Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST), which was created by the U.S.-constructed new Iraqi government with an American-drafted statute, was exclusively funded by the U.S. and had American “assistance.” The U.S. also prevented UN involvement in the trials.  This was deemed a “tool of vengeance by Saddam Hussein’s enemies.”[xii]  The U.S. and European states have yet to hold trials for their politicians who had a hand in Al-Anfal, further highlighting that the trials were used for regime change.

Second, the trials downplayed the atrocities committed against the Kurds. For example, Saddam was executed not for his command of the Kurdish genocide, but for his involvement in the murder of 148 Shiites in 1982.  This too was a deplorable crime. However, that his separate trial for Al-Anfal was terminated for his execution suggests that the motivation for the trials was to get rid of Saddam, not to serve justice.  Furthermore, the Iraqi courts targeted only Al-Anfal’s high-ranking criminals, such as Chemical Ali, and ignored the also liable, low and mid-ranking criminals. This is dubious. because the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) did try mid ranking offenders.  Again, the Kurdish population and the atrocities committed against them have served as a foreign policy instrument, a means to an American end, rather than a significant issues warranting attention.

The aforementioned Halabja survivor who felt “bitter, used, [and] sickened” picked up on the patterns I have described. His town was an excuse for the U.S. to recognize or justify its own objectives, and the story fits in with the realities of selfish U.S. policies towards the Kurds. Because the Kurds no longer provide strategic interests to the U.S., Iraqi Kurds are out of luck regarding American.-assistance and protection.  Unlike other ethnic groups, the Kurds have a small presence in Western countries and even less lobbying power.  While security and national interests must of course figure into a state’s foreign policy, human rights cannot be the tool of such interests.

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[Photo Courtesy of flickr user Amir]

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